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Abstract: Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has come to the forefront of debate over 
corporate rights in the contemporary era. While proponents laud ISDS as a neutral and efficient 
means of dispute resolution, critics claim that it shields transnational corporations from the 
oversight of national legal systems while enhancing their ability to interfere in host state policy 
matters. Moreover, because dispute settlement is carried out in international tribunals, ISDS is 
argued to disable citizen-driven politics. Governments have called on arbitration bodies to 
enhance the transparency of ISDS procedures and open spaces for civil society involvement. 
This reflects a desire to increase the legitimacy of ISDS in the face of mounting contestation. In 
this paper, I examine the multiple ways in which civil society actors intervene in investor-state 
arbitration inside and outside of formal channels. I focus specifically on two disputes involving 
foreign investors active in the water and hydrocarbons sectors of Argentina and Ecuador 
respectively. I find that political pressure exerted by civil society actors influenced government 
decisions to break with investment rules and helped shape government positioning within arbitral 
processes. Civil society actors must therefore be recognised as important participants in investor-
state disputes.  
Keywords: bilateral investment treaties; social movement theory; global assemblage; Argentina; 
Ecuador; natural resources; global governance 
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Civil society groups have come to occupy a prominent position in the global politics of 
trade. The 1999 Battle of Seattle and successive demonstrations outside of multilateral trade 
forums signalled to the international community that citizen demands for inclusive trade 
policymaking would not be easily quelled. In recent years, investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) involving legal claims brought by foreign investors against countries under investment 
treaties and chapters in free trade agreements has become the focal point of civil society 
concerns. Public skepticism of ISDS has been driven by the high number of claims levied against 
states and the powers of review international arbitrators exercise over government policies 
related to public health, natural resource governance and the environment. Indeed, multi-million 
dollar fines have been imposed against states found to have infringed on investment rules. 
Activists have strongly denounced the lack of transparency and accessibility in ISDS 
proceedings as well as the alleged corporate bias of international arbitrators.  
Despite widespread recognition of the public interest implications of ISDS proceedings, 
civil society actors remain conspicuously absent from the growing literature on the politics of 
investor-state arbitration. Only recently have scholars begun to explore civil society participation 
in such proceedings. This effort, however, is largely confined to the limited number of cases in 
which northern civil society organizations (CSOs) open institutionalised spaces for engagement 
(Dumberry 2002; Mann 2002; Marley 2013-14; Puig 2013).1 Such studies raise awareness of the 
multiplicity of actors involved in investment disputes. Yet important questions remain, for 
instance: how do civil society actors intervene in ISDS outside of institutionalised channels and 
what challenges face activists in the global South when seeking to intervene? A significant body 
of literature demonstrates how civil society actors have helped shape the global trade agenda 
inside and outside of formal channels (Hannah 2011; Trommer 2013; Spalding 2007; Von Bülow 
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2010). Shedding further light on civil society engagement in investment disputes within and 
outside of formal spaces will strengthen understandings of how such actors influence the 
enforcement of trade and investment agreements. This has important theoretical and practical 
implications for our understanding of the constraints and possibilities civil society actors face in 
the context of neoliberal globalization and will help expose the legal tools and resources 
available to activists in resisting the negative impacts of investor rights.  
By civil society actors, I refer to both social movements and CSOs. Scholars tend to 
define the terms differently, however there is a consensus that at their most basic, such actors 
‘consist of organised contention …and that this contention is engaged in by those who are in 
some sense excluded from “politics as usual”’ (Arthur 2006: 1, original emphasis). Here, social 
movements are understood to encompass the ‘more nebulous, uncoordinated and cyclical forms 
of collective action, popular protest and networks that serve to link both organised and dispersed 
actors in processes of social mobilization.’ CSOs, on the other hand, refer to the more structured 
and institutionalised forms of collective action that stem from social movements (Mitlin and 
Bebbington 2006: 1). To be clear, I do not argue that civil society actors intervene in all ISDS 
cases. I assume that civil society intervention is more likely in cases where the rights and 
livelihoods of local communities and citizens are implicated.2 The objective of this paper is 
restricted to examining how civil society activism influences the application of investment rules 
where these conditions exist. I focus my analysis on two ISDS cases involving foreign-owned 
companies active in the utility and hydrocarbons sectors of Argentina and Ecuador respectively. I 
chose these disputes because they involve companies whose operations had direct impacts on 
resident livelihoods and, as such, were highly politicised. Both countries also experienced a 
political shift at the national level during the height of the disputes with the election of left-
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leaning governments. They therefore present the opportunity to theorise inductively the multiple 
ways civil society actors intervene and the obstructions that challenge such intervention before 
and after significant change in national political structures. Much of the analysis is informed by 
semi-structured interviews conducted in Ecuador and Argentina as well as an extensive analysis 
of legal documents pertaining to the cases.   
I theorise ISDS as a global assemblage in which a heterogeneous assortment of actors, 
institutions and apparatuses interact in unstable ways to give force and effect to IIAs. Borrowing 
from actor network theory, I examine IIAs as textual objects that are animated through 
interactions between actors as they seek to advance (sometimes competing) interpretations of 
investment rules. Theorizing ISDS in this way lends recognition to the multiple ways in which 
civil society actors can shape the way investment rules are enforced against governments, for 
example, by targeting different actors and institutions or the inter-relationships between them.3 
Yet the concept of assemblage tells us nothing about the strategies civil society actors adopt to 
contest investment rules and intervene in arbitral proceedings. As such, I take insights from 
social movement theory as a starting point to analyze activist strategies, namely the concepts of 
cultural framing, resource mobilization and opportunity structure. Both disputes began as 
localised conflicts between local operators and community activists. Activists employed strategic 
framing practices to mobilise opposition against the companies and elevated the dispute to the 
national-level. This, in turn, placed pressure on state officials to take action against the 
companies in conflict with their IIA obligations. The groups maintained political pressure 
throughout ISDS proceedings to ensure that political officials avoided settlements that would 
have kept the companies in the country. In these ways, activists aided the disputes’ emergence 
and prolonged ISDS proceedings.  
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Yet the points of entry pursued by activists differed in some ways. In Ecuador, civil 
society actors targeted state actors as a means to influence the proceedings while challenging the 
normative foundations on which ISDS rests through an anti-ICSID discourse that linked the 
institution with neoliberal policy, which was heavily contested by various sectors of civil society. 
This provided a political foundation for Ecuador’s withdrawal from the ICSID Convention under 
the Correa administration. In Argentina, activists sought formal entry in ISDS proceedings and 
carved out an unprecedented avenue for civil society participation via amicus curiae. However, 
this channel provided activists with little influence over how investment rules were applied by 
international arbitrators and required that activists adjust their strategy to meet the principles on 
which ICSID is founded. The different strategies reflect variations in activist ideologies and 
perceptions regarding existing political opportunities at the national and international level. 
Both cases suggest that civil society intervention in investment disputes is possible from 
multiple entry points and that activists influence the emergence of investment disputes and 
government positioning during the arbitral process even if institutional spaces allow for only 
limited influence over the proceedings. Yet it is important to note the presence of unique political 
opportunities that enabled civil society groups to exert influence over the dispute. Most notable 
was the election of left-leaning political regimes, which created more conducive political 
opportunities for civil society activism. These opportunities may not be reproduced in countries 
governed by regimes that more strongly support investor rights.  
 
ISDS and the global IIA assemblage 
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ISDS is a relatively new phenomenon in the evolution of international investment law. 
Historically, foreign investors relied on their home states to espouse a claim against their hosts in 
the event of a dispute. Home states, however, were not obliged to take up claims or to settle the 
dispute according to investor preferences, meaning that investors had little control over the 
outcome (Vandevelde 2005: 160). Movement towards ISDS began in the 1960s as the World 
Bank sought to carve out a role for itself in foreign investment promotion, resulting in the 
establishment of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
1965. ICSID was sold to countries as an apolitical project that would enable governments to 
offload responsibility over investment disputes and avoid the diplomatic tensions that resulted 
from state-state dispute resolution (Pauwelyn 2005). ICSID’s institutional skeleton was drafted 
by legal staff and came to reflect, as Pauwelyn (2005: 27) observes, their preference for 
commercial style arbitration: arbitrators are appointed by the disputing parties, which are defined 
as being the state and foreign investor; arbitral awards are not subject to appeal and stress 
financial compensation over soliciting compliance; and, proceedings were to be strictly 
confidential. Arbitration rules developed by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1976 embraced this model (Franchini 1994: 2226). Dual and 
sometimes competing logics of private commercial law and public international law therefore 
came to be embedded in the arbitral system.  
Yet ISDS was not a common feature of international investment agreements (IIAs) until 
the early 1990s, which meant that ICSID and UNCITRAL rules were rarely used. Foreign 
investors pushed for the inclusion of ISDS mechanisms in IIAs as it provided greater control 
over dispute outcomes and avoided the cumbersome process of state espousal (Subedi 2012: 19-
21).  The increasing internationalization of production and the diffusion of neoliberal preferences 
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for economic liberalization and privatization since the 1980s created a more receptive political 
environment for such demands and drove a renewed effort by capital-exporting states, 
particularly the United States, to secure investment protections. Repeated attempts to negotiate a 
multilateral framework for investment protection failed, prompting a turn towards bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) (Miles 2013: 85; Kurtz 2002). 1,857 BITs were signed by 1999, a leap 
from the 102 BITs signed at the end of the 1980s (UNCTAD 2000: 3). This new generation of 
IIAs contained more stringent standards on investment protection and liberalization than earlier 
agreements and reflected a growing consensus on ISDS (Subedi 2012: 96). For civil society 
groups, which were excluded from recognition by arbitral rules, the shift towards ISDS 
represented an attempt to insulate the exercise of investor rights from public scrutiny (Puig 
2013).  
Proponents laud ISDS as a neutral and efficient means of dispute resolution (see 
Movesesian 2008). Critics, however, claim that it shields transnational corporations from the 
oversight of domestic legal systems while enhancing their ability to interfere in host state policy 
matters. By the end of 2015, 696 claims were brought to arbitration by foreign investors against 
over 100 governments, 36 per cent of which have been decided in favour of the state and 27 per 
cent in favour of the investor. 34 per cent of cases were settled or discontinued (UNCTAD 2016: 
105).  This suggests that foreign investors are not always successful in their legal claims. Public 
opposition over ISDS, however, has been driven by the highly publicized instances in which 
tribunal members exercise their powers of review over state regulatory schemes related to public 
health, natural resource governance and basic service provision. Governments and international 
organizations have called on arbitral bodies to enhance the transparency of ISDS procedures and 
open spaces for civil society involvement. This reflects a desire to increase the legitimacy of 
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ISDS in the face of mounting contestation and the recognition that civil society participation can 
strengthen the democratic quality of global governance institutions, for instance, by enhancing 
information-sharing, strengthening accountability mechanisms and giving representation to 
public interests that might otherwise be excluded (Krut 1997; Mercurio and Laforgia 2005; 
Scholte 2011; Castells 2008). Some institutions responded to these calls. For example, in 2003, 
the Free Trade Commission for the North American Free Trade Agreement granted formal 
recognition to the right of third parties, namely CSOs, to submit written statements in the form of 
amicus curiae. ICSID followed suit in 2006 with its revised arbitration rules.4 This suggests that 
civil society contestation is beginning to influence the evolution of ISDS procedures. Yet some 
critics question whether institutional channels provide for meaningful public engagement (Puig 
2013). 
The similarities found across contemporary IIAs in terms of their structure, purpose and 
principles have encouraged scholars to conceptualise the agreements as constituting an 
international legal regime (Haslam 2010; Cho and Dubash 2005; Cutler 2013; Salacuse 2010; 
Milner 2014). This ‘regime’ is understood in the sense of international relations theory as a 
system of governance composed of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that 
constrain and regularise state behaviour (Salacuse 2010: 431). States are not absent of agency 
under international regimes as regimes are not deterministic. ISDS, however, provides a 
particularly strong incentive for states to adhere to investment rules given the threat of costly and 
protracted legal battles and multi-million dollar fines. IIAs, critics argue, therefore reduce host 
state policy autonomy as state officials fear that introducing new regulations will conflict with 
IIA obligations or because they internalise the norms on which the agreements are based and 
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censor their own policies (Blackwood and McBride 2006; Chang 2006; Cho and Dubash 2005; 
Haslam 2007; Spears 2010; Tienhaara 2006; Yazbek 2010).  
Moreover, because disputes are resolved outside of domestic legal systems, ISDS is 
argued to disable citizen-driven politics (Schneiderman 2008).  Claire Cutler (2013: 17), for 
instance, asserts that  
[Investment agreements] set limits to state action in a number of areas of vital public 
concern, including the protection of human and labour rights, the environment, and 
sustainable development. They determine the distribution of power between foreign 
investors and host states and their societies. However, the societies in which they operate 
seldom have any input into the terms or operation of these agreements.  
Cutler notes the participation of CSOs via amicus curiae submissions in ISDS cases, yet their 
inability to influence arbitrators’ judgements leads her to conclude that citizens have no role in 
shaping arbitral proceedings.  
While the regime perspective rightly acknowledges the power asymmetries that inform 
and are reproduced by investment treaties, it has led to a concomitant tendency to exaggerate the 
cohesiveness of investment agreements and the consistency with which investment rules are 
enforced amongst critical scholars. This is while the mechanisms through which the principles 
and norms underpinning IIAs are translated and given force are left under explored and under 
theorised. On their own, IIAs are no more than texts or what actor network theorists call ‘non-
human actants’ (Latour 2005). Non-human actants possess no inherent agency, but act and shape 
action as they engage with human (and non-human) actants. It is through this engagement that 
the specific rules and provisions contained in IIAs become translated into state obligations. Yet 
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IIAs are not intrusive objects that demand engagement as directly as a roadblock does when 
encountered by automobile drivers. IIAs are more abstract in nature and occupy the less concrete 
domain of the global. The capacity of IIAs to act therefore depends on their ability to enroll a 
more complex and geographically dispersed network of actors with whom they can engage. This 
includes, for instance, administrative apparatuses (for example, that of ICSID), international 
treaties (the New York Convention), foreign investors, state actors and the veritable cottage 
industry of legal representatives, arbitrators and expert witnesses that benefit professionally and 
financially from ISDS cases (Olivet and Eberhardt 2012; Van Harten 2008). Also included are 
the civil society actors who engage with investor treaty rights and arbitral processes inside and 
outside of formal spaces.  
Another way to conceptualise this network is to use the metaphor of assemblage. A 
global assemblage refers to a heterogeneous and geographically dispersed assortment of 
components that occupy national and sub-national spaces. These components interact in unstable 
and inconsistent ways, the effects of which can be compromising or empowering for the whole 
or specific parts. They are united, however, by a specific problematization of social relations to 
which a solution of control or management is proposed (Ong and Collier 2005; Rabinow 2003). 
Put another way, IIAs and their networks of power depend on a socially constructed 
problematization of investor-state relations. This problematization informs and is reproduced by 
the ideas and discourses that render IIAs and ISDS as necessary legal interventions. Most 
notably, this includes the economic philosophy, development discourses and technical-legal 
expertise that identify IIAs as a necessary means to secure the ‘friendly’ investment markets 
necessary for economic progress. These ideational factors enable IIAs to forge the networks 
essential to their capacity to act.  
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Conceptualizing IIAs as components of a global assemblage allows us to recognise the 
‘contingent, uneasy, unstable interrelationships’ amongst the multiplicity of actors, 
administrative apparatuses and expertise involved in the enforcement of investment rules (Ong 
and Collier 2005: 12). This has several advantages. First, it necessitates that we interrogate the 
messy and contentious micro-processes through which investment rules are translated into 
specific state obligations. The ambiguous wording of investment provisions, which encourages 
opposing parties to compete over their interpretation and the ad hoc nature of arbitral tribunals 
whose members are not held strictly to jurisprudence, means that investment rules are sometimes 
applied differently across cases.5 Second, it requires that we examine how cooperation between 
actors (sometimes operating at different levels) lends agency to investment rules and the 
limitations of this cooperation. It was commonly assumed that a state would voluntarily oblige 
by arbitral rulings given the risk of capital flight and damage to its international reputation. In the 
era of rising ISDS claims, however, such cooperation is not guaranteed. Investors’ home states 
play an important role in enforcing arbitral rulings in the face of a resistant host state. Yet the 
willingness of home states to introduce sanctions against a host may be limited by other foreign 
policy interests.6 From the perspective of assemblage, the power IIAs exert is not distinguishable 
from the agency of states and other network participants but is shaped and constituted by it.  
Lastly, the perspective of ‘assemblage’ acknowledges the possibility that civil society 
actors interact with investment rules in diverse and intimate ways and places. By acknowledging 
the diversity of actors and institutions engaged in enforcing investment rules and the unstable 
nature of their interactions, the researcher is compelled to examine how civil society actors target 
different assemblage participants in ways that alter how investment rules are applied. For 
instance, civil society actors may adopt strategies aimed at convincing state officials to take 
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action against a foreign investor, which can alter the state’s interactions with the investor, its 
home-state and IIAs. Activists may also seek to influence arbitrators’ engagement with 
investment rules by advancing particular interpretations of key provisions via amicus curiae 
statements.  
It is important to note that states, civil society actors and foreign investors are also 
amalgams of diverse actors and institutions and, as such, are assemblages in their own right. 
Their interrelationships are therefore diverse and unstable. Of particular relevance is the state, 
which is composed of disparate parts that may adhere to competing interests and logics and, as 
such, may not respond to the same stimulus in the same way (Migdal 2001). Different parts of 
the state, moreover, are targeted in different ways by different actors. Civil society actors, for 
instance, can target politicians for decisions on policy and regulation vis-à-vis foreign investors 
and / or officials in the Attorney General Office to influence state responses to investor legal 
claims, yet there is no guarantee that politicians and state legal representatives will respond. 
Moreover, recognising competing logics within the state may help explain why governments 
take a seemingly contradictory approach towards investor claims. For instance, the Kirchner 
administrations in Argentina contested the authority of ICSID and investor rights without 
terminating the ICSID Convention or IIAs as Ecuador has done.  
Yet theorizing ISDS in this way tells us nothing about how civil society actors insert 
themselves into or shape arbitral proceedings. Social movement theorists provide more insight 
into the strategies activists employ to influence political processes. Three concepts have become 
central to social movement theory:  resource mobilization, cultural framing and political 
opportunities. The concept of resource mobilization turns our attention to the use of financial, 
human and technological assets in activist strategies. Studies of resource mobilization examine 
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where resources are available, how they are used and the impact of these factors on desired 
outcomes (Mueller 1992: 3). The concept of framing refers to the creation of ideas and meanings 
and how they are wielded to assign blame, advance interpretations of causation, and advocate 
change (Snow and Bedford 1992: 136). It is used in recognition of the ideational dimensions of 
social activism to draw out the significance of persuasion and argumentation in social movement 
strategies.   
Political opportunities refer to the environmental factors that influence the degree to 
which political processes are open to contestation. The assumption is that civil society actors 
operate within international and domestic contexts of opportunities and constraints and that shifts 
in actors’ political environments lead to corresponding changes in activist strategies (Sikkink 
2005: 154). The concept is most often applied in state-level analyses to explain cross-national 
variation in social movement strategies (Wilson and Cordero 2006: 326). However, as studies on 
transnational social activism acknowledge, activists that target global institutions and processes 
interact with political opportunities above the state (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Reitan 2007). Jackie Smith et al. (1997) uses the term ‘international political 
opportunity’ to recognise the channels created by shifts in the world polity, for example, when 
existing international institutions modify rules to enhance civil society participation in decision-
making processes.  
It is important to note that political opportunities and constraints are not objective factors, 
but are largely perceived (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Sikkink (2005: 164) asserts that 
activists engaged in contesting international institutions typically compare opportunities and 
constraints at the international and domestic levels. Where activists operate in domestic 
environments they perceive as more open than international institutions, activists, often working 
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within transnational networks, are most likely to use domestic protest and political pressure 
activities to try to block particular international commitments or open up international 
organizations. Where activists see both domestic and international institutions as open, they are 
likely to privilege domestic political change but will pursue activism within international 
institutions as a complementary option.  
However, it is important to note that changes in political opportunities can be perceived 
differently. Rose Spalding (2007), for example, found civil society groups divided in response to 
the creation of participatory mechanisms meant to enhance civil society participation in the 
United States - Central America Free Trade Agreement negotiations. While some activists 
viewed the invitation to participate as a valuable achievement and a critical opportunity to 
influence negotiation outcomes, others denounced the participatory mechanisms as an attempt to 
co-opt the opposition movement and grant legitimacy to undemocratic proceedings. This 
variation in the perception of political opportunities she attributes to activist ideologies and 
organizational differences. Indeed, that some civil society actors view international institutions 
as part of the solution while others view such institutions as the problem is a paradox of social 
movement activism and scholarship (Sikkink 2005: 156). In the next section, I employ the 
concepts of framing, resource mobilization and political opportunity to explore some examples 
of how civil society groups intervene in ISDS proceedings in two distinct settings: Argentina and 
Ecuador.  
 
Big Oil and the Anti-Occidental Movement in Ecuador  
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  In 2012, an ICSID tribunal ruled that Ecuador breached the United States-Ecuador BIT 
by expropriating the assets of a US-based oil company, Occidental Exploration. The tribunal 
awarded Occidental over USD$ 1.77 billion, although this was reduced to $1.016 billion 
following an annulment proceeding. On the surface, the dispute appears to stem from 
Occidental’s unauthorised sale of a stake in its concession area to Alberta Energy Company 
(AEC). The sale violated the company’s contractual commitments and Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons 
Law and therefore, government officials claimed, necessitated the contract’s termination. 
Occidental alleged this was a disproportionate response motivated by political interests rather 
than concern over the legality of the concession sale. Indeed, the dispute gained momentum in 
the midst of rising protests against neoliberal reforms fed by the resurgence of indigenous 
organising in 1990. Among the most controversial of reforms was the liberalisation of Ecuador’s 
oil sector. The withdrawal of oil wealth by foreign multinationals and resulting environmental 
damage was seen by activists as emblematic of the injustices undergirding neoliberal policy. 
Anti-neoliberal activists were responsible, in part, for the removal from office of both the Jamil 
Mahaud (1998-2000) and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003 – 2005) administrations in the early 2000s. 
Therefore, when mounting conflicts with indigenous and environmental groups brought 
Occidental to the centre of anti-neoliberal protests in the mid-2000s, government officials were 
forced to take action. Examining the political context in which the dispute arose is therefore 
central to understanding the dispute’s emergence and ultimately its final outcomes.  
Occidental entered Ecuador in 1985 after securing a service contract with the State Petroleum 
Company of Ecuador (SPCE – later renamed Petroecuador) to exploit Block 15 located in the 
Amazonian provinces of Orellana and Sucumbíos. Its operations expanded quickly and by the 
early 1990s, it operated 22 production wells located on six drilling platforms. Tensions between 
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the company’s operators and local communities grew as Occidental’s activities expanded. Block 
15 had for a long time been inhabited by Quechuan communities of Rio Jibino, Limoncocha, 
Itaya and Pompeya. Community members protested the company’s incursion onto hunting and 
farming lands and the mounting damage being done to crops and waterways. Tensions became 
more acute when Occidental began decreasing its promised assistance and employment 
opportunities for local communities (Kimerling 2001).  
Occidental’s expansion was aided by the liberalization of Ecuador’s oil sector. The 
administration of President Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996) instituted a generous system of tax 
incentives and reduced state oversight over the oil sector by restructuring Petroecuador, 
modifying the system of oil contracts, opening downstream activities to private investment and 
expanding the Trans-Ecuadorian Oil Pipe System (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 693).  Oil sector 
privatization was part of Durán’s neoliberal reform effort, which built on the austerity measures 
adopted by previous administrations. Other state owned enterprises were privatised and 
traditional protections and subsidies given to domestic firms eliminated. Durán signed on to 16 
BITs and reformed the country’s system of land ownership to attract foreign investment, which 
strained government relations with indigenous groups as oil companies expanded onto lands 
occupied by indigenous communities (Hey and Klak 1999; Thoumi and Grindle 1992). 
Neoliberal reforms were heavily contested by Ecuador’s burgeoning civil society. In 1995, 
indigenous groups mounted a national campaign aimed at blocking the passage of neoliberal 
policies. Public sector works, urban activists, women’s organisations, human rights activists and 
environmentalists joined the movement to defeat a referendum on the reforms (Collins 2014: 73). 
Oil sector privatization was particularly contested because of the dominant role played by the 
state in oil production since the 1970s. Oil revenues financed the extension of import-substitution 
  
17 
 
industrialisation policies throughout the 1970s and contributed to a public perception of 
economic progress and modernization. Oil production was therefore embedded, as Perreault and 
Valdivia (2010: 692) observe, in the national imaginaries of Ecuadorians as a vital aspect of the 
state’s nation-building project. The entry of multinational oil companies was therefore perceived 
to be equivalent to the surrender of national interests to private foreigner actors. By economic 
standards, the privatization process was a success.  Foreign investment in oil exploration and 
exploitation increased from US$ 90 million in 1991 to US$ 1,120 million in 2001. Known 
reserves increased markedly, from 2,115 billion barrels in the mid-1990s to 4,630 billion by 
2004 (Stanley 2008: 5 – 7). 
The political context in which Occidental expanded its operations was therefore highly 
charged. In 1999, the company secured a more generous contract and in 2000 was given the 
rights with a consortium of investors to construct an oil pipeline from the Amazonian basin to the 
Esmeraldas refinery. By 2000, it had become the largest private oil company operating in 
Ecuador. Then-president Gustavo Noboa Bejarano (2000-2003) championed the pipeline as an 
important source of revenue for the country. Yet protests by environmental groups and 
landowners disrupted progress towards its completion (Hedgecoe 2002). In August 2003, 
demonstrators attempted to take over an oil station operated by Occidental in Sucumbíos but 
were prevented by 300 military officers and armed police. Instead, demonstrators protested 
before the facility in reclamation of the minimal compensation given to indigenous families for 
expropriated land and the environmental damage caused to forests and public water sources. 
Protests ended after demonstrators agreed to bring their concerns to anti-neoliberal protests 
planned for the following days (El Comercio 2003). The environmental destruction and land 
expropriation caused by the pipeline’s construction was framed by protestors as a symptom of 
  
18 
 
corporate greed rather than economic progress, a message that resonated with the anti-neoliberal 
movement (PRNewswire 2002).  
In 2002, Occidental introduced a treaty claim against Ecuador in the London Court of 
International Arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. The claim was a response to an announcement 
made by Ecuador’s Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that oil companies would no longer receive 
reimbursements for value-added tax paid on good and services used in the production of oil for 
export. Occidental alleged that the withdrawal of tax credits was a violation of the United States-
Ecuador BIT. The dispute received widespread attention from civil society groups and fed 
growing anti-US sentiment. In 2004, the UNCITRAL tribunal ruled in Occidental’s favour, 
awarding the company USD$ 75 million. Ecuadorian attorneys challenged Occidental’s win in 
annulment proceedings, albeit unsuccessfully. The Attorney General then initiated a review of 
the company’s practices to ensure it had complied with its own contractual obligations. Upon 
conclusion of the audit, the Attorney General announced in a public radio address that 
Occidental had breached the contract by selling a 40 per cent stake in its concession to AEC 
without proper ministerial authorization.7 He then wrote to the Minister of Energy and Mines, 
Eduardo López and the President of Petroecuador requesting the termination of Occidental’s 
contract.  
The audit findings fuelled public outrage and established a basis under Ecuadorian law on 
which the government could terminate Occidental’s contract. This, in turn, provided expanded 
political opportunities for the expression of anti-Occidental messaging. Concerned indigenous 
and environmental groups framed Occidental’s UNCITRAL win and continued operations in the 
country as endemic of broader injustices underwriting neoliberal policy, oil privatization and 
Ecuador’s relations with the United States. This frame appealed to a large cross-section of 
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activists. In the early months of 2005, demonstrators congregated in the streets of Quito and in 
front of Occidental offices to demand the cancellation of Occidental’s contract and an end to free 
trade negotiations with the United States.8 Protestors included members of workers’ unions, 
indigenous campesinos and middle class activists. The anti-Occidental movement, which was 
previously confined largely to the Amazonian basin, found a place on the national stage. This 
enabled the movement to capture the attention of left-leaning legislators who opened up greater 
political opportunities by helping push forward efforts to expel the company. 
In February 2005, Minister López and Petroecuador executives were called before the 
National Congress to explain why the termination had experienced delays. In April 2005 after 
days of violent protests, congress members ousted President Gutiérrez and replaced him with his 
Vice President, Alfredo Palacio (2005 – 2006). During a major strike the following June, several 
government officials including the new Minister of Energy and Mines, Iván Rodríguez, signed a 
resolution directed towards the provinces of Orellana and Sucumbíos where protests were most 
violent, stating:  
The Minister of Energy and Mines and the President of Petroecuador…commit to 
undertaking all of the necessary steps for the departure from Ecuador of the companies 
Occidental and EnCana AEC for having violated the juridical norms of the country.9  
Yet no immediate action was taken and protests persisted. Frustrated with government inaction, 
attacks on installations and occupations by community groups in the provinces of Sucumbíos and 
Orellana in August 2005 cut private oil production in the area by half. Protestors called for 
higher wages, more jobs for local people and the construction of infrastructure such as schools, 
roads and health clinics. President Palacio responded by sending troops to occupy the provinces 
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under a state of emergency (Weitzman 2006). This exacerbated the conflict and led to increased 
demands for the outright nationalisation of the oil sector. It is important to note that protestors 
did not object to oil exploitation, but sought a larger share in the benefits and the adoption of 
more sustainable environmental practices. Such demands, protestors believed, were unlikely to 
be met by a private multinational.  
In November, 27 members of congress called for the impeachment of Minister Rodríguez 
if he failed to conclude the termination process. Protestors also convened a general strike, 
effectively paralyzing transportation networks in the north and center of the country. The strike’s 
leaders offered, ‘if caducity (termination) of the Occidental contract is declared, we will lift the 
strike’.10 Occidental’s continued operation in the country was seen as flying in the face of the 
country’s laws and as reflective of the failure of government officials to discipline corporate 
interests. The Confederación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE), a leading voice in anti-Occidental protests, 
issued a statement, which read:  
[Occidental] has violated the law and misled the Ecuadorian state...we are tired of the fact 
that the rich and powerful in this country do not comply with law and can cheat and steal 
with impunity. We agree with the order given by the State Attorney and Petroecuador and 
demand the immediate termination of Occidental’s contract and its immediate expulsion 
(AmazonWatch 2006, author’s translation). 
During the lead up to the presidential elections in May 2006, then-presidential candidate 
Rafael Correa led demonstrations outside of Occidental offices calling for the company’s 
closure. The same day, various CSOs demanded the impeachment of President Palacio for 
  
21 
 
considering a settlement with the company. On 15 May 2006, the Minister issued a decree, 
formally terminating Occidental’s contract and ordering the company to turn over its assets to 
Petroecuador.11  Petroecuador employees took over Occidental offices while the army was sent 
to guard the facilities. Occidental introduced its ICSID claim the next day and accused the 
government of terminating its contract without legitimate cause. The termination, they argued, 
was motivated by a desire for revenge after Occidental’s win in the VAT dispute and to appease 
the demands of organised pressure groups. The termination proceedings, the company argued, 
were therefore unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate in violation of the BIT.12    
The termination of Occidental’s contract was in part a direct response to civil society 
demands made under the threat of political reprisal. However, there are no provisions in the 
United States-Ecuador BIT that oblige or enable arbitrators to weigh citizen demands against 
investor rights. Arbitrators therefore interpret investment rules in isolation from the dispute’s 
political context unless, as in this case, political demands are referenced as evidence to support 
claimants’ assertion of discriminatory treatment. In response, state lawyers for Ecuador claimed 
that the termination was made necessary by Occidental’s own actions after it sold the stake in its 
concession area in violation of its contractual commitments and the Hydrocarbons Law. Activist 
concerns related to the company’s operations did not prevail within the arbitral proceedings. In 
their final ruling, the arbitrators found that Ecuador had acted in accordance with its rights under 
the concession contract, but had acted disproportionately in expropriating the company’s assets. 
Yet not all arbitrators translate investment rules in the same way. In her dissenting 
opinion, arbitrator Bridgette Stern denounced the US$1.77 billion award against Ecuador 
rendered by her colleagues, asserting that, 
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The consequence of the fault committed by [Occidental], when they violated the 
Ecuadorian law, is overly underestimated and insufficiently taking into account 
the importance that each and every State assigns to the respect of its legal order 
by foreign companies.13 
The damages, she concluded, should be reduced according to the proportion of the concession 
area sold off by Occidental. An annulment tribunal agreed and reduced the award by 40 per cent.  
The anti-Occidental movement began as localised movement confined to the Amazonian 
provinces most affected by Occidental’s operations. Yet by tying the repercussions of Occidental 
activities to issues of corporate greed, indigenous and environmental activists exploited public 
dissatisfaction with neoliberal reforms. This served to unite broad swaths of civil society in 
contentious protests against the company. These large-scale mobilizations were central to the 
movement’s ability to prompt state action against Occidental as they captured the sympathy of 
nationalist legislators who provided a more direct channel for protestor demands to shape 
political decision-making. The timing of the 2006 presidential elections further expanded 
political opportunities as Correa took up protestor demands, largely as a means to shore up his 
own political popularity. Yet activists did not seek formal participation in the legal proceedings 
as they viewed IIAs and arbitral bodies as fundamentally biased towards corporate interests and 
as reproducing power asymmetries between US corporations and Ecuadorian citizens. Rather, 
activists kept a watchful eye on the proceedings and maintained pressure on state officials to 
avoid a settlement that would keep Occidental in the country. This drastically reduced the kinds 
of concessions Ecuadorian officials could offer Occidental to stave off a potentially negative 
ruling. In this way, activists exerted influence over the ISDS proceedings and ultimately its final 
outcome.  
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Occidental’s BIT claims were accompanied by several others brought by foreign oil 
companies, including the now infamous claim by Chevron introduced in response to its loss in a 
class action lawsuit brought by residents of the Amazonian rainforest. These disputes generated 
widespread social opposition against ICSID and BITs. Correa’s election in 2006 signalled an 
important political shift in Ecuador and in the country’s relationship to the global IIA 
assemblage. Correa campaigned on promises to institute a ‘Citizen’s Revolution’ and ‘21st 
Century Socialism’, which earned him populist appeal and a majority government (Conaghan 
2008). Correa leveraged public opposition to ICSID to reduce the country’s linkages with the IIA 
assemblage and create greater space for the advancement of his political agenda, notably by 
terminating BITs with El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay and Romania. In 2008, Correa also denounced the ICSID 
Convention as a violation of Ecuador’s Constitution. Article 422 of the Constitution, passed in 
2008 via public referendum, forbids the government from ceding jurisdiction to international 
arbitration entities outside of Latin America. The article is a manifestation of widespread 
dissatisfaction with arbitral rulings in the highly publicised battles with oil companies like 
Occidental (Gomez 2012). However, Ecuador has not terminated its BIT with the United States. 
This decision reflects the way in which investor-state relations have been problematised in 
development discourses.  Officials believe the BIT is a necessary legal intervention that helps 
attract and retain foreign capital despite the risk of future investor claims.14 While Correa’s 
election provided greater political opportunity for the expression of social opposition to investor 
rights, Correa has been selective in Ecuador’s withdrawal from the global IIA assemblage and 
has protected foreign investment attraction as a policy priority.  
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Water Politics in Buenos Aires, Argentina: Between Investor Rights and Human Rights 
Argentina has faced the greatest number of investor-state disputes out of any country in 
the world (UNCTAD 2015). The majority of disputes stem from the emergency measures 
introduced by the government to placate the symptoms of a severe economic crisis that hit the 
country in 2001. The crisis caused widespread political and economic instability as poverty rates 
doubled and mass protests erupted in demand of state action. The emergency measures, 
introduced in January 2002, placed a freeze on utility rates and eliminated the right of utilities 
owners to calculate tariffs in US dollars while tariffs were converted to a fixed peso rate. The 
Currency Convertibility Plan, which pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar was also 
terminated, causing the peso to devalue by almost 70 per cent. The terms of investors’ original 
contracts proved no longer viable due to the severe strain placed on users’ budgets whose 
incomes had significantly devalued. Since their debts were nominated in US dollars, many 
foreign investors operating in the utilities sector faced severe financial losses (Vicien-Milburn 
and Andreeva 2010: 295). Over 40 treaty claims were brought against Argentina by foreign 
investors whose contracts were negatively impacted. 
Among the most controversial of cases was a joint claim brought by Suez and Vivendi 
Universal, based in France, Spain-based Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona and the AWG 
Group based in the United Kingdom. Together, the investors owned and operated Aguas 
Argentina S. A. (AASA), a company established for the purposes of operating water and 
wastewater services in the province of Buenos Aires and 17 surrounding municipalities, an area 
previously serviced by the state-owned company Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (National 
Sanitation Works, OSN). The investors alleged that the emergency measures amounted to an 
illegal expropriation of their investments and a denial of their treaty rights to full protection and 
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security and fair and equitable treatment. Argentine state lawyers, however, asserted that the 
measures were necessary to ensure citizens reliable and affordable access to water in line with 
the state’s human rights obligations. 
The sale to private investors of the concession area was part of a larger privatization 
process initiated by the government of Carlos Menem (1989 – 1998) as a solution to the hyper-
inflationary crisis experienced by the country during the late 1980s. Menem aimed to attract 
foreign investment into the utilities sector to reduce state spending and improve services that had 
considerably deteriorated. Menem therefore introduced policies aimed at liberalizing Argentina’s 
investment market, notably the Currency Convertibility Plan in March 1991, and signed on to 55 
BITs. The Convertibility Plan was instituted as a means to combat Argentina’s historic volatility 
to high inflation and give confidence to foreign investors (Haselip and Potter 2010: 1168). This 
scheme was eventually reflected in the concession contract of AASA as rates were fixed in US 
dollars.  
To generate support for water privatization, officials promised residents that water and 
sewer access would be expanded in communities without access and that tariff rates would be 
reduced for those connected. The OSN had largely failed to expand service delivery in suburban 
communities, particularly in the poorest areas, leaving many without access. Water shortages 
plagued the city in the summer and most sewage was discharged without treatment, polluting 
local rivers and groundwater sources and enabling the spread of disease. These issues resulted 
largely from deteriorating infrastructure and OSN’s ineffective tariff collection practices. 
Leading up to the privatization, the government increased water tariffs and included a new 
infrastructure fee in the bills of newly connected customers to make the concession area more 
attractive to foreign investors. After winning the concession contract, AASA introduced a 26 per 
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cent reduction on water tariffs as a means of generating support amongst community members. 
The concession contract also set out ambitious targets for service upgrades and expansion. Over 
the 30-year contract, the company was to attain universal water coverage for the concession area 
and increase access to sanitation services to 90 per cent and the treatment of wastewater to 93 per 
cent (Schiffler 2015: 32).  
During the first months of the company’s operations, the number of households 
connected to the water and sewer network increased and customer service improved.15 Soon 
after, however, the company pressed for a series of tariff increases in exchange for a 
commitment to accelerate some investments, including the construction of a wastewater 
treatment plant. In 1994, the company increased tariffs by 13.5 per cent while water and 
wastewater infrastructure connection fees increased by 36 and 48 per cent respectively. In 1997, 
the company again renegotiated tariff increases while the government waved fines levied against 
the company for its failure to reinvest earnings into infrastructure upgrades (Schiffler 2015: 41). 
Estimates suggest that the average water bill grew by almost 90 per cent during the company’s 
first decade of operation while commitments to upgrade and expand service delivery went 
unmet. In many neighbourhoods, households were forced to continue dumping sewage into 
rivers, makeshift septic tanks or directly onto the street, which exacerbated environmental and 
public health problems. This is while the company made record profits year after year (Vilas 
2016).  Consumer advocacy groups sprung up across the concession area to protest increases to 
water bills. Activists steeped their opposition in a human rights discourse: by allowing the 
company to increase water bills, the government made it impossible for residents to access 
affordable water in violation of the human right to water guaranteed under international law. 
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Many consumers refused to pay the infrastructure connection fees and in 1996, street protests 
erupted in several suburban communities against attempts to collect it (Schiffler 2015: 40).   
Towards the end of the 1990s, a series of external shocks led to the rapid deterioration of 
economic conditions in Argentina. Output plummeted and GDP fell, peaking in 2002 at a 10 per 
cent contraction (Wylde 2011: 437). Food riots broke out in Buenos Aires, to which the 
government responded with violent repression led by police forces. Street protests then exploded 
in most major cities to demand the resignation of Menem’s successor, Fernando de la Rúa. In 
December 2001, de la Rúa stepped down and Argentina cycled through five presidents in under 
three weeks until an interim government led by Eduardo Duhalde was established (Wylde 2011: 
438). It was under Duhalde that Congress instituted the emergency measures (Law 25.562). It 
was clear that the measures would negatively impact foreign investors, particularly in the utilities 
sector. Duhalde therefore offered investors two options: renegotiate tariffs or continue with the 
tariff system denominated in pesos (Stanley 2006: 7).  
AASA demanded that the Central Bank provide US dollars at the one-to-one exchange 
rate, but the government refused. The company then requested a 42 per cent tariff increase, but 
the government rejected the request as it meant increasing the water bills of increasingly 
impoverished citizens. This drove the company to freeze its investments and default on its loans, 
which had grown to almost US$700 million despite the company’s profitmaking (Schiffler 2015: 
41). AASA introduced its ICSID claim in 2003, demanding USD$ 1,019.2 million in 
compensation. Argentina challenged the legitimacy of ICSID’s jurisdiction, claiming that the 
dispute was a contractual matter better left to the authority of its own domestic legal system. 
Over the next four years, AASA serviced the concession area while attempting to renegotiate the 
terms of its contract with government officials. Consumer advocacy groups paid close attention 
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to the negotiations and demanded a hardline approach. Many activists called for the outright 
renationalization of the concession area. While public opposition to the company buttressed the 
government’s bargaining power, it also meant that officials were constrained in the concessions 
they could offer in order to arrive at a settlement (Post and Murillo 2013). Without a settlement, 
AASA was unlikely to drop its ICSID claim.  
In 2006, after renegotiations again failed, the government of Néstor Kirchner terminated 
the concession contract and renationalised the company’s assets. The same year, the ICSID 
tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute and arbitral proceedings began. Kirchner was 
elected in 2003 as the leader of the Frente para la Victoria, a faction of the Peronist party 
traditionally associated with populism and state intervention. He sought to revise the terms on 
which contracts with foreign investors were negotiated by providing consumer groups a formal 
presence in the unit constituted to lead the renegotiations. This opened up significant political 
opportunities for the expression of civil society concerns related to AASA operations. Like 
Correa, Kirchner promised to reverse neoliberal orthodoxy. He also sought to reaffirm the 
government’s commitment to human rights by repealing the amnesty granted by previous 
administrations to those involved in the Dirty War. However, Kirchner’s brand of leftist politics 
placed less emphasis than Correa on reforming perceived exploitative trade and investment 
relations with the West. Kirchner focused instead on strengthening the country’s position in the 
global political economy through selective state intervention, namely through industrial and 
macroeconomic policy. The subtle but significant differences between Kirchner and Correa in 
ideology and developmental strategies reflect variations in the sociopolitical and economic 
contexts of Ecuador and Argentina, particularly the progressive forces that saw the regimes to 
power.16   
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During the proceedings, Argentina’s State Attorney General defended the emergency 
measures as a necessary means to address the crisis conditions and were therefore justifiable 
under the necessity defence. The necessity defence refers to the use of specific provisions found 
in most BITs and under international law that exempt government action taken in times of crisis 
from full treaty coverage.. AASA, state lawyers argued, must bear part of the adjustment burden 
as citizens and domestic businesses had done. Consumer groups and human rights groups 
protested the lack of transparency in the proceedings and sought to open opportunities for 
participation. A coalition of domestic CSOs, including consumer groups and think-tanks with 
expertise in international law, joined forces with a Washington-based think tank to petition the 
ICSID tribunal for access.17 Although some activists feared participating in the arbitration would 
legitimate a process fundamentally biased towards corporate interests, others perceived the need 
to give voice to citizen concerns.18 For the more institutionalised CSOs, such as the Centre for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) based in Washington and the Asociación Civil por la 
Igualdad ya la Justicia (Civil Association for Equality and Justice), opening up opportunities for 
civil society input presented a means to advance their broader goal of creating more democratic 
and participatory decision-making structures at the international level. CIEL, moreover, does not 
object to international investment rules in principle but instead aims to enhance civil society 
capacity to shape investment rules so that they may better promote sustainable development.  
The coalition allowed activists to mobilise complementary resources. While consumer 
groups possessed an intimate knowledge of the company’s operations and its impacts on local 
communities, the larger CSOs were equipped with the expertise needed to draft legal petitions. In 
January 2005, the coalition submitted a joint ‘Petition for Transparency and Participation as 
Amicus Curiae’ with the Secretary of the Tribunal, in which the coalition requested formal 
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access to the hearings, the opportunity to present legal arguments in the form of amicus curiae 
and unrestricted access to court documents. The coalition argued that the case involved matters 
related to the fundamental rights of people living in the concession area, which were best 
represented by the people themselves.19 
 ICSID Arbitration Rule 32 (2) regulates the participation of persons in ICSID hearings. It 
states that, ‘Unless either party objects, the Tribunal…may allow other persons besides the 
parties…to attend or observe all or part of the hearings.’ Both the claimant(s) and respondent 
must therefore agree to permit the attendance of non-parties, including civil society groups. 
While state lawyers consented to the coalition’s request, AASA objected to the coalition’s entry 
and access to court documents, arguing that it would unfairly favour the state. However, neither 
the ICSID Convention nor ICSID arbitration rules touch on the issue of amicus submissions, 
leaving this element of the petition open to question. Section 44 of the ICSID Convention 
provides that ‘if any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the 
Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.’ In 
their decision, the Tribunal allowed the coalition’s request, acknowledging that, 
The acceptance of amicus submissions would have the additional desirable consequence 
of increasing the transparency of investor-state arbitration. Public acceptance of the 
legitimacy of international arbitral processes, particularly when they involve states and 
matters of public interest, is strengthened by increased openness and increased 
knowledge as to how these processes function.20 
This marked the first time in ICSID history that a tribunal decided it had the power to accept 
amicus submissions. In their submission, the coalition drew attention to the human right to water 
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under international treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Argentina’s refusal to allow tariff 
increases was a necessary step, the petition argued, to meet its human rights obligations.21 By 
framing the dispute as a human rights issue, the coalition sought to leverage the conflict between 
investor rights under IIAs and human rights under public international law to alter the way in 
which arbitrators translated the BIT.  
It is important to note that while state lawyers did not consult activists in the development 
of the state’s defence, activist discourse regarding the government’s human rights obligations 
was emulated by state lawyers throughout the ISDS proceedings and in other cases involving 
claims by water companies. This is likely because the human rights frame strengthened the 
state’s argument that instituting the emergency measures was a necessary response to the crisis 
conditions and was therefore excusable according to the necessity defence. Observations 
regarding the company’s failure to meet community needs, which were first articulated by 
consumer rights activists were also echoed by state lawyers during the proceedings. Such 
observations supported the state’s assertions that the company violated its contractual 
commitments well before the contract was terminated. Activists therefore had an indirect, but 
significant influence over the state’s defence strategy.  
The tribunal, however, found that Argentina’s refusal to revise the tariffs according to the 
concession contract and its ‘forced’ pursuit of contract renegotiations was in violation of the 
company’s right to fair and equitable treatment.22 The tribunal rejected the coalition’s argument 
that Argentina’s human rights obligations to assure citizens the right to water trumped its BIT 
commitments. Rather, they asserted that Argentina’s human rights obligations and its BIT 
obligations were not inconsistent, contradictory or mutually exclusive and that Argentina could 
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have respected both types of obligations.23 No mention, however, was made to how Argentina 
may have allowed AASA to raise tariffs while maintaining impoverished communities’ access to 
water. The amicus curiae petition therefore failed to prevail over arbitrator judgements. Instead, 
arbitrators responded to the state’s necessity defence, concluding that,  
Given the frequency of crises and the emergencies that nations, large and small, face 
from time to time, to allow them to escape their treaty obligations would threaten the very 
fabric of international law and indeed the stability of the system of international 
relations.24  
The tribunal awarded the investors just over US$ 405 million. Therefore, while the coalition 
opened an unprecedented opportunity for civil society participation in arbitral proceedings, 
participating via an amicus curiae submission meant that activists adjusted protest strategies to 
meet the parameters laid out by arbitrators and the disputing parties. This is contrast to the more 
widespread rejection of ICSID’s authority following the Occidental dispute in Ecuador. While 
Kirchner placed a freeze on signing new BITs, the government did not terminate existing 
agreements nor withdraw from the ICSID Convention.  
Civil society groups mobilised against the company and unresponsive regulators in the 
lead up to the 2001 economic crisis. During the crisis, the Duhalde administration acknowledged 
that drastic measures were needed to quell citizen unrest and ensure access to basic services for 
impoverished consumers. Civil society activism and demands for access to basic services 
therefore provided, in part, the impetus for the Duhalde government’s introduction of the 
emergency measures challenged by AASA. In this way, civil society activism was an important 
driver of the dispute’s emergence. The election of Néstor Kirchner expanded political 
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opportunities for activists, namely by enhancing their influence over contract renegotiations with 
the company. This reflected Kirchner’s desire to renew state alliances with progressive factions 
of civil society, particularly human rights activists. As in Ecuador, activist pressure helped shape 
government positioning in the renegotiations and ultimately helped inform government decisions 
to renationalise the concession area. Although this ultimately led to a negative ruling against the 
state, it was in agreement with activists’ ultimate goal of ending the company’s monopoly over 
local water sources.25 Therefore, while the dispute on the surface appeared to be a contractual 
matter, the dispute’s emergence and the arbitral proceedings cannot be understood fully in the 
absence of its broader social and political context.  
 
ISDS and Citizen-Driven Politics at the Margins 
By defining the state and foreign investor as the sole ‘parties’ to the dispute, arbitration 
rules significantly narrow the formal ways in which civil society actors can participate. Yet that 
does not mean that ISDS proceedings are insulated from civil society intervention. As both case 
studies demonstrate, civil society actors have multiple means of intervening in the enforcement 
of investment rules. Both disputes have their origins in localised conflicts between the 
companies’ operators and surrounding communities. Yet activists employed strategic frames to 
put the disputes on the national political agenda. In Ecuador, the negative impacts of Occidental 
operations on indigenous communities and the environment were framed as reflective of 
corporate greed and injustices undergirding neoliberal policy. This fed on growing anti-US 
sentiment and public skepticism of neoliberal reforms. In Argentina, community activists framed 
their opposition to AASA as a human rights issue, which drew attention to the conflict between 
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investor rights and the rights of citizens under public international law. Mass protests and 
community actions also proved invaluable for activists that otherwise had limited access to 
financial and technical resources with which to sway political decision making. Mounting 
political pressure, combined with each government’s desire to establish cooperative alliances 
with progressive factions of civil society, blocked state officials from meeting their commitments 
under IIAs, leading to the disputes’ emergence. Civil society groups maintained political 
pressures throughout the ISDS proceedings to ensure that political officials avoided settlements 
that would have kept the companies in the country. Indeed, both companies were renationalised 
following investors’ exit. This suggests that civil society can have an important influence on 
government positioning throughout arbitral proceedings.  
Yet, the points of entry pursued by activists differed in some ways. In Ecuador, civil 
society groups stayed at the margins of the dispute while targeting the normative foundation on 
which ISDS rests through anti-neoliberal discourse and by mobilising opposition against ICSID. 
This altered the relationship between Occidental and the Ecuadorian state, which had previously 
been cooperative, and helped lay the groundwork for Ecuador’s withdrawal from ICSID and the 
termination of select BITs. Yet it is important to note that Ecuador’s selective withdrawal from 
the global IIA assemblage was also motivated by Correa’s desire to buttress his political appeal 
and recover state sovereignty lost to neoliberal restructuring. In Argentina, activists coupled 
community actions with efforts to open formal opportunities for participation. In doing so, 
activists carved out an unprecedented avenue for participation and helped reshape procedural 
rules. Arguments advanced by activists through the amicus submission failed to prevail over 
arbitrators judgements while participating in this way helped legitimate existent arbitral rules. 
The technical-legal expertise needed to participate through written testimony may prove to be a 
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significant barrier for civil society participation in the future, particularly in the developing world 
where activists have less access to technical resources. However, arbitrators do not engage with 
IIAs in the same way, as demonstrated by Bridgette Stern’s dissenting opinion in the Occidental 
case. Therefore, the opening of new avenues for civil society participation in arbitral proceedings 
may signal greater opportunities for activist influence in the future.   
The variation in activist approaches can be attributed to differences in ideology and 
perceptions of political opportunities. Indigenous and environmental activists in Ecuador saw 
ISDS, and ICSID in particular, as a mechanism through which corporate actors assert power over 
countries in an era of expanding corporate rights. Given the relative success of anti-neoliberal 
movements in staving off neoliberal reforms at the national level, activists believed there to be 
greater political opportunities at the national level to advance their agenda and objected in 
principle to participating in ISDS. Their efforts therefore focused on blocking state officials from 
meeting their commitments to Occidental under the US-Ecuador BIT. In Argentina, community 
activists contested the corporate bias they saw as inherent in the arbitral process which placed the 
property rights of foreign investors above the human rights of community members. Yet they 
were joined by more experienced and reform-oriented CSOs that sought to create more inclusive 
international decision-making structures. Opening up opportunities for civil society participation 
in ISDS and appealing to Argentina’s human rights obligations under public international law, 
from their view, was an opportunity to correct for institutional corporate bias.  These cases 
confirm Sikkink’s expectations that activists will pursue their agendas at the domestic level when 
international institutions are perceived to be relatively more closed. Yet they also demonstrate 
that activists perceive opportunity structures differently and their perceptions of which are in part 
influenced by ideology. This suggests that opportunity structures are at least in part subjective.  
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Applying the metaphor of assemblage to ISDS turns analytical attention to the diverse 
actors and processes involved in the enforcement of investment rules. Understanding how these 
actors interact at the global and domestic levels is essential to understanding the uneven way in 
which investment rules are applied across time and space. It also opens up greater space to 
examine and theorise how domestic actors intervene to shape arbitral processes. The risk, 
however, is that we under-emphasise important structural forms of power in the global economy. 
Certainly the creation and functioning of the global IIA assemblage is not in the absence of 
asymmetrical power relations between countries, foreign investors and civil society groups. Yet, 
exploring the contested ways in which investment rules are translated into state obligations 
renders more visible the important role citizens play in shaping the political outcomes of 
international institutions and neoliberal globalization.  
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1 This includes ISDS cases in which NGOs participated through public hearings and the submission of 
written testimony:  Methanex v. the United States, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada and 
Glamis Gold v. United States of America.   
2  How civil society activism varies across disputes involving foreign investors active in different 
economic sectors and contexts is a question for further research.  
3 Enforcement in this study refers to the process of holding a government accountable to investment rules 
through international arbitration. It is not meant to refer to the process of enforcing specific arbitral 
awards against governments where foreign investors win out in ISDS cases.  
4 Several governments, including Canada and the United States, have also begun including provisions that 
require the public release of court documents in investment treaties. 
5 For instance, international tribunals in LGE v. Argentina and CMS v. Argentina disagreed as to whether 
the 2001 economic crisis met the conditions of necessity, contributing to seemingly contradictory rulings 
on the state’s liability.  
6 For example, while negotiations towards a free trade agreement between Ecuador and the United States 
were brought to a halt following Ecuador’s disputes with US-based oil companies, the United States 
government refused demands by oil companies to retract Ecuador’s ATPA status as it would have risked 
the country’s refusal to cooperate in the War on Drugs, a significant foreign policy priority 
(Ghaemmaghami 2003/4).  
7 See  Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 5 October 2012, pp. 61 para 174-176. 
8 See  Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 5 October 2012, pp 63, para 181. 
9 See Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 5 October 2012, pp 65, para 187. 
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10 See Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 5 October 2012, pp 67, para 196. 
11 See Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 5 October 2012, pp 67, para 197-199.  
12 See Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 5 October 2012, pp 69-70, para 203 – 206. 
13 See Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the 
Republic of Ecuador, Dissenting Opinion, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 20 September 2012.  
14 Interview with National Assembly member, Quito, 8 October 2014. 
15 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, pp. 15 – 17. 
16 It is beyond the capabilities of this paper to provide a full comparison of the regimes. Several studies 
however provide excellent insight, see: Conaghan 2008; Levitsky and Murillo 2008; Cameron 2009; 
Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009; de la Torre 2014; Wylde 2011. 
17 This included the Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Limitada De Provisión de Servicios de Acción 
Comunitaria (Free Consumers Cooperative of Service Provision and Community Action), the Unión de 
Usuarios y Consumidores (Users and Consumers Union), the Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la 
Justicia (Civil Association for Equality and Justice), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Centre of 
Legal and Social Studies) and the Centre for International Environmental Law based in Washington. 
18 Interview with former activist, Buenos Aires, 14 April 2014. 
19 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Petition for Transparency and Public Participation as Amicus Curiae, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, 28 January 2005, pp 3, para 4. 
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20 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Petition for Transparency and Public Participation as Amicus Curiae, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, 28 January 2005, pp 9 para 20 – 22. 
21 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Amicus Curiae Brief, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 4 April 2007. 
22 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010, pp. 94 para 242. 
23 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010, pp.102 para 262. 
24 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A. and Vivendi Universal S. A. v. the Republic of 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010, pp. 258. It is important to 
note that tribunals rejected the necessity defence in several cases while others agreed with the defence. 
According to Peterson (2012), arbitrators rejected Argentina’s necessity defense with unanimous 
decisions in five cases (CMS, Sempra, Enron, BG and National Grid) and by a two to one majority in 
three cases (Suez, Impreglio and El Paso). Arbitrators accepted the defense to some extent in three cases 
(LG&E, Continental Casualty and Total). 
25 It is important to note that AASA requested its contract be terminated to enable it to exit the market in 
light of the rising costs of service provision. The Kirchner government refused the request on the basis 
that no other provider could be found to meet the community’s needs in the meantime. The contract was 
abruptly cancelled by the Kirchner government in 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
References 
 
Amazonwatch (2006), ‘Ecuador: CONAIE Continues Protests against Andean Free Trade Pact 
and Occidental Petroleum’. Available from: http://amazonwatch.org/news/2006/0320-ecuador-
conaie-continues-protests-against-andean-free-trade-pact-and-occidental-petroleum [accessed 29 
April 2016].  
 
Blackwood, E. and McBride, S. (2006), ‘Investment as the Achilles Heel of Globalisation? The 
Ongoing Conflict between the Rights of Capital and the Rights of States’, Policy and Society, 25 
(3), 43-67. 
 
Castells, M. (2008), ‘The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks 
and Global Governance’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
616 (1), pp. 78 – 93. 
 
Cameron, M. (2009), ‘Latin America’s Left Turns: Beyond Good and Bad’, Third World 
Quarterly, 30 (2), pp. 331 – 348. 
 
Chang, H.-J. (2006), ‘Policy Space in Historical Perspective with Special Reference to Trade and 
Industrial Policies’, Economic and Political Weekly, 41 (7), pp. 627-633. 
 
Cho, A. H. and Dubash, N. K. (2005), ‘Will Investment Rules Shrink Policy Space for 
Sustainable Development? Evidence from the Electricity Sector’, in K. Gallagher (ed), Putting 
Development First: The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and International Financial 
Institutions (London & New York: Zed Books), pp. 146 - 178.  
 
Collins, J. N. (2014), ‘New Left Experiences in Bolivia and Ecuador and the Challenge to 
Theories of Populism’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 46, pp. 59 – 86. 
 
Conaghan, C. (2008), ‘Ecuador: Correa’s Plebiscitary Presidency’, Journal of Democracy, 19 
(2), pp. 46 – 60. 
 
Cutler, C. (2013), ‘Human Rights Promotion through Transnational Investment Regimes: An 
International Political Economy Approach’, Politics and Governance, 1 (1), pp. 16-31.   
 
De la Torre, C. (2014), ‘The People, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s 
Ecuador’, Constellations, 21 (4).  
 
Della Porta, D. and Tarrow S. (2005), Transnational Protest & Global Activism (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield). 
  
41 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Dumberry, P. (2002), ‘The Admissibility of Amicus Curiae Briefs by NGOs in Investors-States 
Arbitration: The Precedent Set by the Methanex Case in the Context of NAFTA Chapter 11 
Proceedings’, Non-State Actors and International Law, 1, pp. 201 – 214.  
 
El Comercio (2003), ‘Oil Impacted Communities Protest at OCP and Occidental Petroleum 
Facilities’, 20 August. 
 
Franchini, J. (1994), ‘International Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A 
Contractual Provision for Improvement’, Fordham Law Review, 62 (7), pp. 2222-2244. 
 
Ghaemmaghami, H. (2003/4), ‘Can’t Live with ‘Em, Can’t Live without ‘Em: Ecuadorian 
Value-Added Tax Laws, Foreign Oil Investors and the Andean Trade Preferences Act’, 
Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 10, pp. 391 – 406.  
 
Gomez, K. F. (2012), ‘Ecuador’s Attainment of the Sumak Kawsay and the Role Assigned to 
International Arbitration’, in K. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 451 – 488. 
 
Grugel, J. and Riggirozzi, P. (2009), Governance After Neoliberalism in Latin America (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
Hannah, E. (2011), ‘NGOs and the European Union: Examining the Power of Epistemes in the 
EC’s TRIPS and Access to Medicines Negotiations,’ Journal of Civil Society, 7 (2), pp 179 – 
206. 
 
Haslam, P. A. (2007), ‘The Firm Rules: Multinational Corporations, Policy Space and 
Neoliberalism’, Third World Quarterly, 28, pp. 1167-1183 
 
Haslam, P. A. (2010), ‘The Evolution of the Foreign Direct Investment Regime in the Americas,’ 
Third World Quarterly, 31, pp. 1181-1203. 
 
Haselip, J. and Potter, C. (2010), Post-neoliberal Electricity Market ‘Re-reforms’ in Argentina: 
Diverging from Market Prescriptions?’, Energy Policy, 38 (2), pp. 1168 – 1176. 
 
Hedgecoe, G. (2002), ‘Protests Delay Completion of Ecuador Oil Pipeline’, Financial Times 28 
August. 
 
  
42 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Hey, J. A. and Klak, T. (1999), ‘From Protectionism towards Neoliberalism: Ecuador across 
Four Administrations (1981-1996)’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 34 (3), 
pp. 66-97. 
 
Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithica: Cornell University Press).  
 
Kimerling, J. (2001), “International Standards in Ecuador’s Amazon Oil Fields: The 
Privatization of Environmental Law,” Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 26, pp. 289. 
 
Krut, R. (1997), Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-
Making (Geneva: UNRISD). 
 
Kurtz, J. (2002), ‘A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law, 23 (4), pp. 713 – 789. 
 
Latour, B. (2005), Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Lee, Y.-C. B. (2013), ‘Global Capital, National Development and Transnational Environmental 
Activism: Conflict and the Three Gorges Dam’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43 (1), pp. 102-
126. 
 
Levitsky, S. and Murillo M. V. (2008), ‘Argentina: From Kirchner to Krichner’, Journal of 
Democracy, 19 (2).  
 
Mann, H. (2002), ‘Opening the Doors, At Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in 
Methanex v. United States’, Review of European Community & International Environmental 
Law, 10 (2), pp.241-245. 
 
Marley, J. (2013-14), ‘The Environmental Endangerment Finding in International Investment 
Disputes’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 46 (3), 33 – 1003 – 
1040. 
 
Mercurio, B. and Laforgia R. (2005), ‘Expanding Democracy: Why Australia should Negotiate 
for Open and Transparent Dispute Settlement in its Free Trade Agreements’, Melbourne Journal 
of International Law, 6 (2), pp. 485. 
 
  
43 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Milner, H. (2014), ‘Introduction: The Global Economy, FDI and the Regime for Investment’, 
World Politics, 66 (1), pp. 1 – 11. 
 
Mitlin, D. and Bebbington, A. (2006), ‘Social Movements and Chronic Poverty Across the 
Urban-Rural Divide: Concepts and Experiences’, Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working 
Paper No. 65. Manchester: University of Manchester.  
 
Movesesian, M. (2008), ‘International Commercial Arbitration and International Courts’, Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law, 18 (2). 
 
Mueller, C. M. (1992), ‘Building Social Movement Theory’, in A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller 
(eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), pp. 8 – 44.  
 
OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) (2005), Transparency and 
Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures, OECD Working 
Papers on International Investment (France: OECD publishing). 
 
Olivet, C. and Eberhardt, P. (2012), Profiting from Injustice: How law firms, Arbitrators and 
Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom (Corporate Europe Observator and the 
Transnational Institute: Brussels/Amsterdam).  
 
Ong, A. and Collier, S. (2005), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics and Ethics as 
Anthropological Problems (Wiley Blackwell). 
 
Pauwelyn, J. (2014) ‘Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of International 
Investment Law’, in Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn and J. E. Viñuales (eds), The Foundations of 
International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford: Oxford UP), pp. 11-44.  
 
Perreault, T. and Valdivia G. (2010), “Hydrocarbons, Popular Protest and National Imaginaries: 
Ecuador and Bolivia in Comparative Context’, Geoforum, 41, pp. 689 – 699.  
 
Post, A. and Murillo, M. (2013), ‘The Regulatory State Under Stress: Economic Shocks and 
Regulatory Bargaining in the Argentine Electricity and Water Sectors,” in B. Morgan and N. 
Dubash (eds.), The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in 
Emerging Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 115 – 134. 
 
PRNewswire (2002), ‘Julia Butterfly Hill Arrested in Ecuador Oil Protest; Occidental 
Petroleum’s Quito Office Shut Down by Protestors’, 17 July.  
 
  
44 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Puig, S. (2013), ‘Emergence & Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State 
Arbitration & International Investment Law’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, 44 (2), 
pp. 531-608. 
 
Rabinow, P. (2003), Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment (Princeton: Princeton 
UP) 
 
Reitan S. (2007), Global Activism (London: Routledge). 
 
Salacuse, J. (2010), ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’, Harvard International Law 
Journal, 51 (2), 427 – 551.   
 
Schiffler, M. (2015), Water, Politics and Money: A Reality Check on Privatization (Switzerland: 
Springer) 
 
Scholte, J. A. (2011), Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Schneiderman, D. (2008), Constitutionalising Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and 
Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
 
Smith, J., Pagnucco, R. and Chatfield, C. (1995), Transnational Social Movements and Global 
Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (New York: Syracuse UP). 
 
Snow, D A. and Benford, R. D. (1992), ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in A. Morrs and 
C. McClurg (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven and London: Yale UP) pp. 
133 – 155. 
 
Spalding, R. (2007), ‘Civil Society Engagement in Trade Negotiations: CAFTA Opposition 
Movements in El Salvador,’ Latin American Politics and Society, 49 (4), pp. 85-114. 
 
Spears, S. (2010), ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment 
Agreements,’ Journal of International Economic Law, 13(4), pp. 1037-1075.  
 
Stanley, L. (2006), ‘La Argentina y Los Tratados Bileterales de Inversion: El Costo De Los 
Compromisos Internactionales’, Desarrollo Economico, 46 (182), pp.189-214. 
 
Subedi, S. (2012), International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Portland: 
Hart Publishing) 
 
  
45 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Thoumi, F. and Grindle, M. (1992), La Politica de la Economia Del Ajuste: La Actual 
Experiencia Ecuatoriana (Quito: FLACSO). 
 
Tienhara, K. (2006), ‘What You Don’t Know can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the 
Protection of the Environment in Developing Countries’, Global Environmental Politics, 6 (4), 
73 – 100.   
 
Trommer, S. (2013), Transformations in Trade Politics: Participatory Trade Politics in West 
Africa (London: Routledge).  
 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2000), Bilateral investment 
treaties 1959-1999 (Geneva: United Nations).  
 
UNCTAD. 2016. World Investment Report (Switzerland: United Nations). 
 
Vandevelde, K. (2005), ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’, Journal of 
International Law & Policy, 12 (1), pp. 157 – 194. 
 
Van Harten, G. (2008), ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and its Policy Implications for Capital-
Importing States,’ in D. Sánchez-Ancochea and K. Shadlen (eds), The Political Economy of 
Hemispheric Integration: Responding to Globalization in the Americas (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan). 
 
Vicien-Milburn, M and Andreeva, Y. (2010), ‘Testing the Procedural Limits of the ICSID 
Annulment Regime in Cases against Argentina’, in Sauvant, K. (ed), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Vilas, C. (2016), ‘Water Privatization in Buenos Aires’, NACLA. Available from: 
https://nacla.org/article/water-privatization-buenos-aires [accessed 29 April 2016] 
 
Von Bülow, M. (2010), Building Transnational Networks: Civil Society and the Politics of Trade 
in the Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge UP). 
 
Weitzman, H. (2006), ‘Ecuador Erupts in Protests over US Oil Group,’ Financial Times, 10 
May. 
 
Wilson, B. M. and Cordero, J.C. R. (2006), ‘Legal Opportunity Structures and Social 
Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics,’ Comparative Political 
Studies, 39 (3), pp. 325 – 351. 
 
  
46 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Wylde, C. (2011), ‘State, Society and Markets in Argentina: The Political Economy of 
Neodesarrollismo under Nestor Kirchner, 2003 – 2007,’ Bulletin of Latin American Research, 30 
(4), pp. 436-452. 
 
Yazbek, Nicole. 2010. “Bilateral Investment Treaties: the Foreclosure of Domestic Policy 
Space”, South African Journal of International Affairs, 17 (1), pp. 103 – 120. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
My sincere gratitude goes to all those who provided feedback on an earlier version of this article 
when it was presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association 
(Atlanta, 2016). Particular thanks goes to Laura Macdonald and Katja Daniels for their detailed 
suggestions. I am also indebted to Cristina Rojas and William Walters for their insights as this 
project developed. Finally, I thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their excellent 
comments and suggestions. 
